

## HAZELWOOD MINE FIRE

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AT THE MINE ON SUNDAY 9 FEBRUARY 2014

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY						
6:45am	<p>The pre-start meeting for the day shifts of the 1 x 7 Services and 2 x 12 Operations crews.<sup>1</sup></p> <p>At the pre-start meetings, Shift Supervisors referred to the total fire ban day, the existence of the Hernes Oak fire, and the need for additional caution and alertness as regards fire risks and conditions.<sup>2</sup></p> <p>The <i>Fire Preparedness and Mitigation Plan</i> for Saturday 8 February 2014 had been incorporated into the Shift Notes for Saturday 8 and Sunday 9 February 2014.<sup>3</sup> It summarised the actions to be taken in relation to fire risks, and the available resources, as follows:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">Day</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Actions to be taken</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Manning &amp; Available resources</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;"><b>Sunday 9 February 2014</b></td> <td> All personnel on high alert   All unmanned machines to be fully hosed up   Relocate portable sprays if necessary within the Mine Coal Areas to maximise water spray coverage   1x7 Services Group to put sprays on intermittently from Sunday 09/02/14 from 0700 hrs.   All 2x12, 1x7 and Earth Works Group to operate on channel 29 UHF radios during times of High Alert. </td> <td> Adequate manning on 1x7 crew   Diamond Protection fire tanker available   2 x Delta 30 tonne tankers operating on site   Mine fire truck available </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Day	Actions to be taken	Manning & Available resources	<b>Sunday 9 February 2014</b>	All personnel on high alert  All unmanned machines to be fully hosed up  Relocate portable sprays if necessary within the Mine Coal Areas to maximise water spray coverage  1x7 Services Group to put sprays on intermittently from Sunday 09/02/14 from 0700 hrs.  All 2x12, 1x7 and Earth Works Group to operate on channel 29 UHF radios during times of High Alert.	Adequate manning on 1x7 crew  Diamond Protection fire tanker available  2 x Delta 30 tonne tankers operating on site  Mine fire truck available
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6:45am - 7:00am	2 additional RTL contractors commenced work at the Mine, to man 30,000L water carts and conduct fire patrols, pursuant to the <i>Fire Preparedness and Mitigation Plan</i> and related arrangements agreed by Robert Dugan and David Shanahan on Friday 7 February 2014. <sup>4</sup>						
7:00am – 1:00pm	Additional wetting down was undertaken on the operating face of the Mine by the 1 x 7 Services Crew via manual activation of the western header sprays. <sup>5</sup>						
11:00am	A small fire broke out in the operational part of the Mine, caused by a faulty idler. This fire was quickly and fully extinguished by the 2 x 12 Operations crew. <sup>6</sup>						
11:00am	In light of the weather conditions around the Mine, and the potential for fire, the Diamond Protection Crew put on their wildfire turnout gear, and stayed around the Mine						

<sup>1</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [33].

<sup>2</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [33].

<sup>3</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [29] and Annexure 6.

<sup>4</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [34].

<sup>5</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [17]; Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [31]; Shanahan T263.4-8; Mauger T282.26-31.

<sup>6</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [37] and Annexure 7.

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
	Gatehouse. <sup>7</sup>
11:38am	Alan Roach, Hazelwood's rostered Emergency Services Liaison Officer ("ESLO") made a phone call to Nick Demetrios from AGL Loy Yang (returning a missed call from a minute prior). Nick Demetrios is chairman of the Central Gippsland Essential Industry Group ("CGEIG"). <sup>8</sup>  Demetrios advised Roach that he had just attended a briefing at the Traralgon Regional Control Centre, at which he was informed that the fire was still burning at Hernes Oak and that stronger winds were expected in the afternoon. <sup>9</sup>
11:50am – 12:20pm	Alan Roach drove along the Princes Freeway to assess the condition of the fire at Hernes Oak, prior to arriving at the Mine at 12:27pm. <sup>10</sup>  Roach observed that the Hernes Oak fire was not particularly active, the Princes Freeway was open, and there was a small amount of smoke. <sup>11</sup>
Midday	As at midday, there were 35 Hazelwood employees and contractors on site at the Mine. <sup>12</sup>
12:20pm	Dean Soares, 1 x 7 Shift Supervisor, overheard on UHF radio forestry workers at the Hancock Victorian Plantation ("HVP") plantations situated between Hernes Oak and the Mine, commenting that there was little fire activity, and making arrangements for an offsite lunch break. <sup>13</sup>
12:27pm	Alan Roach arrived at the Mine. and shortly afterwards observed small plumes of smoke rise from the Hernes Oak fire. <sup>14</sup>
12:30pm	Diamond Protection personnel observed an increase in fire activity at Hernes Oak, via a thermal camera. <sup>15</sup>
12:30pm	Personnel in the 1 x 7 crew took a lunch break in the "brew room" between approximately 12:30pm and 1pm. <sup>16</sup>  During this period, the two 30,000 L water carts manned by RTL personnel remained on fire patrol. <sup>17</sup>
12:45pm	Alan Roach entered the Mine Training Centre, to clean things up, and make sure that it was available for use as an Emergency Control Centre in the event of a fire. <sup>18</sup>
1:00pm	Ian Wilkinson (2 x 12 Crew Shift Supervisor) entered the brew room where the 1 x 7 Services Crew were having lunch. Wilkinson advised the 1 x 7 Shift Supervisor Dean Soares that the Hernes Oak fire had flared up and was starting to travel towards the Mine.

<sup>7</sup> Diamond Protection Incident Report, First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), Annexure 13.

<sup>8</sup> Police Statement of Alan Roach, pages 2-3 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>9</sup> Police Statement of Alan Roach, pages 2-3 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>10</sup> Police statement of Alan Roach, page 3, (Exhibit 25).

<sup>11</sup> Police statement of Alan Roach, page 3, (Exhibit 25).

<sup>12</sup> Third Witness Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 58), [4].

<sup>13</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [39].

<sup>14</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach; Police statement of Alan Roach, page 3 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>15</sup> Diamond Protection Incident Report, First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), Annexure 13.

<sup>16</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [18].

<sup>17</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [41].

<sup>18</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach; Police statement of Alan Roach, page 3 (Exhibit 25).

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
	<p>In response to this advice, Soares:<sup>19</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• radioed both of the water carts, and directed them to station themselves in the north western part of the Mine;</li> <li>• directed Shane Chapman to get the Mine fire truck over to the grass level of the north western part of the Mine to patrol the perimeter for fire;</li> <li>• directed certain personnel to deploy to the North West batters to turn on sprays along level 1; and</li> <li>• directed the remaining members of the 1x7 crew to get furphys and attach them to their vehicles and look for embers and hot spots around level 1 North West batters.</li> </ul>
1:20pm	<p>Alan Roach received a telephone call from the gatehouse (Brian Cunliffe, Diamond Protection), advising him that the Hernes Oak fire was flaring up.</p> <p>Roach looked out of the window of the Mine Training Centre to make a visual observation of the fire conditions, and observed a fire front of about 2 kilometres.<sup>20</sup></p>
1:20pm	<p>The 1 x 7 Services Crew, Mine fire truck and two 30,000L water carts were positioned in the north western part of the Mine near the Mine perimeter / Marriots Road, as the fire front of the Hernes Oak fire burnt towards the Mine.<sup>21</sup></p> <p>Dean Soares and James Mauger directed Andrew Pocklington and Geoff Smith to bring graders to the north west part of the Mine to grade in fire breaks.<sup>22</sup></p> <p>At 1:23pm, Mauger took a photograph of fire activity to the north west of Marriots Road.<sup>23</sup></p> <p>The Mine personnel at Marriots Road witnessed spot fires ahead of the main fire front, and saw embers from the fire blowing over their heads towards the open cut.<sup>24</sup></p>
1:30pm	<p>The Driffield fire is believed to have commenced at three separate ignition points on Strzelecki Highway between Driffield Road and Mirboo North, to the South West of the Mine.<sup>25</sup></p>
1:36pm	<p>Alan Roach called Steven Harkins to provide an update regarding the Hernes Oak fire.<sup>26</sup></p>
1:15pm	<p>Peter Dixon (Diamond Protection) received a phone call from an Emergency Service Officer (“<b>ESO</b>”) in the CFA, notifying him that the Hernes Oak fire had jumped Marriots Road.</p> <p>Diamond Protection subsequently notified the Mine of this advice, and deployed the Diamond Protection tanker to the Mine.<sup>27</sup></p>

<sup>19</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [18] – [20]; Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7) [40] – [42].

<sup>20</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach; Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 3 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>21</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7) at [41]; Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [21].

<sup>22</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [21].

<sup>23</sup> Statement of James Mauger at (Exhibit 8) [22].

<sup>24</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [107].

<sup>25</sup> First Statement of Craig Lapsley at [55]; Lapsley T.34.21-28; Prezioso T.361.1-3.

<sup>26</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach; Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 4 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>27</sup> Diamond Protection Incident Report, First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), Annexure 13.

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
1:40pm	<p>A strong wind change occurred with the wind changing to a westerly initially, and then a south westerly. The initial westerly wind change caused a fire to burn within 100m of the Mine boundary fence on the north side of the Mine.<sup>28</sup></p> <p>Given the easterly direction of the Hernes Oak fire activity, Dean Soares directed that a 30,000L water cart position itself at MWN electrical substation, approx. 400m from the fire, to watch for embers and conduct asset protection.<sup>29</sup></p> <p>MWN substation is positioned along the same corridor as the 66kV lines supplying MWN and MWW substations.</p>
1:45pm	<p>Steven Harkins arrived at the mine and proceeded to the Mine Shift Supervisor's office/ Coal Centre Attendant's office.<sup>30</sup></p>
1:45pm	<p>Dean Soares and James Mauger drove to the Morwell River diversion in the north western part of the Mine, to lookout for spot fires caused by embers from the Hernes Oak fire.<sup>31</sup></p> <p>From this location, Soares and Mauger observed that the Hernes Oak fire had crossed the Strezlecki Highway and was within the Mine licence boundary to the north of the open cut.<sup>32</sup></p> <p>Soares directed the Mine fire tanker and the second 30,000L water cart to patrol the north west part of the Mine in the vicinity of the Morwell River, and to patrol for fire spotting over the Morwell River, which was acting as a fire break. During this time, two graders were working in tandem, putting in a fire break.<sup>33</sup></p>
1:50pm	<p>David Shanahan arrived at the Mine and proceeded to the Mine Control Centre.<sup>34</sup></p>
1:50pm	<p>James Mauger and Shane Chapman, in the Mine tanker in the north-west part of the Mine, in the vicinity of the Morwell River diversion, were concerned about burning embers which they observed flying overhead for some time, and decided to patrol inside the Mine boundary for fire.<sup>35</sup></p>
1:55pm	<p>Shane Chapman and James Mauger, in the Mine tanker, met Trevor Shaw on the North/North West batters, and reported to him that they had been unable to locate any smoke.</p> <p>From that position, Mauger noticed a small amount of blue smoke coming from the Eastern/South East batters in the vicinity of TP7.<sup>36</sup></p> <p>They decided to travel across to that side of the Mine to inspect the area. As they drew closer, Shaw called Mauger on his mobile phone to confirm that it was indeed smoke.</p> <p>Shaw directed Chapman and Mauger to take the Mine tanker to the level above the fire, and to couple the Mine tanker to the water main so as to ensure a constant supply of water.<sup>37</sup></p>

<sup>28</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8) at [23] and [24]; Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [44].

<sup>29</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8) at [23] and [24]; Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [44].

<sup>30</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [46].

<sup>31</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [25].

<sup>32</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [26].

<sup>33</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [26].

<sup>34</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 8), [45].

<sup>35</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [27].

<sup>36</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [32].

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
1:55pm	Alan Roach instructed David Shanahan to open the Drilling Depot Road gates. <sup>38</sup>
2.00pm	On his drive towards the Drilling Depot Road gates, David Shanahan observed smoke: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>in the southern outlet of the Mine (South East/Eastern batter) in the vicinity of TP7; and</li> <li>on the Strezlecki Highway from about 3 locations to the south west of the Mine, which he assessed as moving in the direction of the Mine, and potentially posing a big threat,</li> </ul> and notified the control centre via radio. <sup>39</sup>
2:00pm	A fire alert was declared within the Mine. <sup>40</sup>
2.00 pm onwards	Additional personnel arrived at the Mine, in response to calls for assistance. <sup>41</sup> Many had delayed journeys to the Mine due to road closures. <sup>42</sup>
2:05pm	David Shanahan met Dean Suares near the Perimeter Road to the north of the Mine.  Shanahan advised Suares that the Hernes Oak fire was now burning away from the Mine, following the wind change.  Shanahan alerted Suares to the separate Driffield fire threat.  Suares directed resources, including water carts and earthmoving equipment to make mineral earth breaks. <sup>43</sup>
2:05pm	James Mauger, Shane Chapman, Trevor Shaw, the 2 x 12 Leading Hand gang, the Road Runners, Geoff Crisp and Diamond Protection attempt to extinguish fire on the Southern / South Eastern batters at TP7. <sup>44</sup>
2:07pm	Alan Roach was notified of the separate fire at Driffield. <sup>45</sup>
2:10pm	Romeo Prezioso observed fire on the northern-batters, on the floor of the mine in the overburden dump and the southern outlet (TP7). <sup>46</sup>  Prezioso asked Ian Wilkinson to direct dozers to the overburden dump to smother that fire. <sup>47</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [33].

<sup>38</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach; Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 4 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>39</sup> Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [47] and [49].

<sup>40</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [50] and Annexure 10; Log of events produced by Alan Roach (Exhibit 25).

<sup>41</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7) at [45] and [54]; Shanahan T222.12-13 and T.273.9-31; First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [56]; Prezioso T.358 29-30.

<sup>42</sup> Faithful T385.24-30; First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [73].

<sup>43</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [51] to [54].

<sup>44</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [34] and [35]; First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [54], Annexures 9 and 10.

<sup>45</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach (Exhibit 25); Roach T.645.26-28.

<sup>46</sup> Prezioso T362.4-20.

<sup>47</sup> Prezioso T363.2-11.

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
2:10pm	David Shanahan opened the gates on the north western Mine boundary on Drilling Depot Rd, near the RTL compound, so as to provide access for the CFA (in response to a request made by Alan Roach at 1:55pm) and took some photos of the fire activity in the vicinity of Drilling Depot Road and the Strezleki Highway. <sup>48</sup>
2:15pm	Alan Roach and Matt Weddell drove to the south west part of the Mine to TP5 to assess the fire situation, and to open gates to let traffic through.  At that time, Weddell turned on sprinklers for the conveyors. <sup>49</sup>
2:17pm – 2:38pm	David Shanahan drove from Drilling Depot Road in the north west of the Mine, to the Mine Lookout in the south west of the Mine (in a clockwise direction), and during the drive observed: <sup>50</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a Mine fire truck at TP7 at the location where he had previously observed smoke;</li> <li>• fire on the floor of the Mine, in the overburden dump area, above the clean water pump station; and</li> <li>• a small fire on the lower level of the northern batters, to the west of the clay capped fire hole.</li> </ul>
2:25pm	Alan Roach and Matt Waddell drove to the lookout above the Southern Batters of the open cut, where they stopped to assess the Driffield fire. At this time, they observed that there was a strong south westerly wind. <sup>51</sup>  Roach observed smoke from the Driffield fire travelling towards Morwell over the open cut. Roach observed embers and other material in the smoke as it was going across the open cut. <sup>52</sup>  Roach considered that the Driffield fire, and not the Hernes Oak fire, was the active threat to the Mine. <sup>53</sup>  As Roach looked back towards Morwell, he noticed pockets of smoke on the North/North West batters near the Mine base level, possibly level 7 or level 5. He observed that an old geological hot spot/ fire hole known as “Old Faithful”, was not putting up any smoke. <sup>54</sup>
2:30pm	Alan Roach contacted Ricky Ross at the Traralgon Regional Control Centre, on his mobile, to inform him that the fire at Driffield was beginning to spot into the open cut.  Ross told Roach to call the Traralgon Incident Control Centre (“ <b>ICC</b> ”) on 5177 3200. <sup>55</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [55]; Shanahan T229.14-22.

<sup>49</sup> Log of events produced by Alan Roach (Exhibit 25); Roach T646.4-17; Roach T646.22-26.

<sup>50</sup> Statement of David Shanahan, [56] to [59].

<sup>51</sup> Roach T646.26-31 and T646.1-10; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 5 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>52</sup> Roach T646.26-31 and T646.1-10; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 5 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>53</sup> Roach T646.26-31 and T646.1-10; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach at page 5, (Exhibit 25).

<sup>54</sup> Roach T646.26-31 and T646.1-10; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 5 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>55</sup> Roach T647.16-17; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police statement of Alan Roach, page 5 (Exhibit 25).

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
2:30pm	James Mauger saw smoke coming from 5 level on the northern batters. <sup>56</sup>
2:50pm	The Diamond Protection Log notes a report received from the Diamond Protection tanker, then positioned on the southern batters of the Mine, that "Ash [is] falling from Yinnar side on location". <sup>57</sup>
2:31pm	Alan Roach received a radio message from Peter Dixon on the Diamond Protection tanker, informing Roach that the area beneath the open cut control centre (on the Southern/South Eastern batters) was under ember attack. <sup>58</sup>
2:32pm	David Shanahan took a photo of the Driffield fire from the wash down pond near TP5. <sup>59</sup>
2:38pm – 2:48pm	Several Mine personnel including David Shanahan, Matt Weddell and David Bell met at the new Mine lookout to obtain an overview of fire activity, and in order to discuss further steps in fire response. <sup>60</sup>  At that time, a decision was made by Shanahan, Weddell and Bell to get some more sprays onto the operating face, and to switch off some sprays which they could see operating on the western end of the northern batters above pond 8, on 5 and 3 level <sup>61</sup> where there was no fire activity <sup>62</sup> .
2:40pm	From the Eastern/South Eastern batters, James Mauger observed smoke coming on level 5 of the North/North West batters.  Mauger and Shane Chapman deployed to the North/North Western batters of the Mine in the Mine tanker in order to fight this fire. <sup>63</sup>
2:43pm	Alan Roach received a call from Peter McHugh at the Traralgon ICC. McHugh was returning a call by Roach.  Roach told McHugh that there was a fire in the Driffield area, embers were falling, and fire was spotting in the open cut. <sup>64</sup>
2:48pm	David Shanahan drove to the western part of the Northern/North Western batters, and commenced turning non-essential sprays off. <sup>65</sup>
2:50pm	Alan Roach overhead Ian Wilkinson, Shift Supervisor, on the radio requesting that water be turned on at the 520 conveyor. <sup>66</sup>
2:55pm	David Shanahan took a photo of the Northern/North Western batters fire.  By that time, there was fire activity on level 5, level 3 and possibly level 1. <sup>67</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [36].

<sup>57</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins, [62] and Annexure 9.

<sup>58</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach; Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 5, (Exhibit 25).

<sup>59</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [58].

<sup>60</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [59] to [60]; Shanahan T230.11-31, T231 and T232.1-2.

<sup>61</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [61] to [62].

<sup>62</sup> Shanahan T268.23 – 25.

<sup>63</sup> Mauger at [36]; Mauger T279.27-31 and T280.1-6.

<sup>64</sup> Roach T649.14-31 and T650.1-21; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 6 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>65</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [62], [66] and [68]; Shanahan T231.29-31, T232.1-2 and T235.8-15.

<sup>66</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 6 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>67</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [64].

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
2:56pm	David Shanahan took a photo of sprays that had been activated on the operating face as a fire protection measure. <sup>68</sup>
2:57pm	Aircraft observed by David Shanahan dumping water and retardant on the Northern/North Western batters fire. <sup>69</sup>
Approx. 3:00pm	From a vantage point behind the Mine Office/ Control Centre above “the knuckle”, Steven Harkins observed embers (grass and leaves which were alight) from a westerly direction blowing into the Mine. <sup>70</sup>  Harkins observed that winds were gusting in powerful bursts and were swirling within the Mine. <sup>71</sup>
Shortly after 3:00pm	James Mauger observed aircraft dumping water and retardant on the fire on the Northern/ North Western batters. <sup>72</sup>
Shortly after 3:00pm	James Mauger and Shane Chapman redeployed to 3 level on the North / North Western batters (above their previous position on 5 level), as the fire had spread up the batter. <sup>73</sup>
3:10pm	Alan Roach arrived back at the Emergency Command Centre and liaised with Diamond Protection to arrange additional 2 way radios to hand out to CFA strike team leaders once they arrived, as the CFA operates on a different radio frequency. <sup>74</sup>
3:15pm	James Mauger observed power lines sagging on the Northern/ North Western Batters. <sup>75</sup>
3:10pm – 3:15pm	Alan Roach had a conversation with Steven Harkins, who determined that in light of the extent of the fire activity, it was appropriate to escalate the Mine’s emergency response under the Emergency Response Plan, and declare an emergency. <sup>76</sup>  Harkins directed that Romeo Prezioso should become the Emergency Commander (relieving Ian Wilkinson of responsibility under the Emergency Response Plan for directing the response to the fire). <sup>77</sup>
3:20pm	Aircraft were observed by James Mauger dumping water and retardant on Northern/ North Western Batters fire. <sup>78</sup>
3:25pm	David Shanahan was positioned in north-western and western part of the Mine, liaising with RTL contractors led by David Bell.  The RTL crew was clearing mineral earth breaks and patrolling for fire. <sup>79</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [65]; Shanahan T234.30-31 and T235.1-7.

<sup>69</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7) ,[67].

<sup>70</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [60]; Harkins T331.11 - 24.

<sup>71</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [60]; Harkins T331.5 - 10.

<sup>72</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8) at [38].

<sup>73</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [39].

<sup>74</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 6 (Exhibit 25)

<sup>75</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [40].

<sup>76</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [64] - [66]; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 6 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>77</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins [64] - [66]; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 6 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>78</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8) , [41].

<sup>79</sup> Statement of David Shanahan, [69] – [70].

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
3:30pm	As at 3:30pm, there were 58 Hazelwood employees and contractors on site at the Mine. <sup>80</sup>
3:35pm	Romeo Prezioso met Alan Roach at the Mine's Emergency Control Centre (set up in the Training Centre), which at that time was formally established. <sup>81</sup>
3:38pm	David Shanahan took a video from 1 level road of the fire activity on the Northern/ North Western batters.  Steven Harkins separately observed that the fire on the Northern/North Western batters grew considerably between 3:30pm and 4:30pm. <sup>82</sup>
3:47pm	Alan Roach again contacted Peter McHugh at the Traralgon ICC and provided a further situation report including that fire was burning within the Mine <sup>83</sup> , and to discuss available support and back up. <sup>84</sup>
3:52pm	Alan Roach again called Peter McHugh at the Traralgon ICC to advise him that he had received a radio message from the crews on the ground that the fire in the north west part of the Mine licence area was now spreading eastwards, and had reached the Morwell Main Drain. <sup>85</sup>
4:04pm	Alan Roach again contacted the Peter McHugh at the Traralgon ICC and discussed aerial support for firefighting, particularly in relation to the clean water pump station. <sup>86</sup> Roach told McHugh that the Mine needed CFA assistance. <sup>87</sup>
4:05pm	Alan Roach received an email from the Traralgon ICC, with aerial photographs of fire activity, and was requested to identify the locations of critical infrastructure for aerial support. <sup>88</sup>  The subject bar of the email was entitled "Yallourn Open Cut", but included a summary of a number of the issues that Roach had raised with McHugh. <sup>89</sup>  Photos of the wrong mine (Yallourn) were attached. <sup>90</sup>  Roach called McHugh at the Traralgon ICC to advise him that the photos were of the wrong mine. <sup>91</sup>
4:15pm – 4:40pm	Mine staff activated sprays on the North West batters to create a water barrier, and protect the operating face in the event of a wind change.  In some locations, heads were removed from sprays so that the water would shoot up into the air, and wet the surrounding area. <sup>92</sup>

<sup>80</sup> Third Witness Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 58), [4].

<sup>81</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [64] - [66]; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 6 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>82</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [69].

<sup>83</sup> Roach, T651.5 – 9.

<sup>84</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 7, (Exhibit 25).

<sup>85</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 7 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>86</sup> Roach, T652.

<sup>87</sup> Roach, T653.4.

<sup>88</sup> Roach T652.29-31, T653 and T654.1-22; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>89</sup> Roach T652.29-31, T653 and T654.1-22; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>90</sup> Roach, T653.24.

<sup>91</sup> Roach, T654.4 – 17.

<b>TIME (APPROX)</b>	<b>ACTIVITY</b>
4.30pm – 6:30pm	Fires broke out in the West field operating area in the vicinity of 620 and 720 tail end. 2 x 12 Operations crew personnel successfully fought these fires. <sup>93</sup>
4:45pm	<p>Alan Roach was advised by Matt Weddell that several Mine personnel and the Diamond Protection tanker were positioned at the MWN substation, with Beaconsfield and Boolara CFA tankers.</p> <p>Roach understood that these personnel were fighting fires and trying to protect the MWN substation and associated power lines, given their role in supplying the Mine's water pumps.<sup>94</sup></p> <p>Within approximately an hour of arriving at the Mine, these CFA resources were called away.<sup>95</sup></p>
5.00pm - 7.00pm	<p>Power lost to parts of the Mine<sup>96</sup> due to fire damage to the separate 66kV lines powering MWN and MWW.</p> <p>Power to one pumping station (Pumphouse 50) servicing the reticulated fire service network, separately supplied through substation MWE, was unaffected.<sup>97</sup></p>
5:30pm	The fire on the south eastern / eastern batters was making its way out of the open cut due to the wind, causing grass fires. <sup>98</sup>
5.00pm	Shane Chapman and James Mauger fighting the fires on the floor of the Mine in the overburden dump with the Mine tanker.
5:30pm	<p>Trevor Shaw was at the dirty water pump station at the floor of the Mine, trying to get the pumps working. His efforts were unsuccessful as power had been lost.</p> <p>Shaw advised Chapman and Mauger that that they should fill up the Mine tanker near the dirty water pump station, using gravitational forces.</p> <p>Chapman and Mauger were able to fill the tanker once using this method.<sup>99</sup></p>
6.10pm	<p>David Shanahan drove to M690 head end and advised 2 Energy Brix personnel looking over the fence that the Mine had no water to stop fire from getting into the ditch bunker.<sup>100</sup></p> <p>Shanahan tried to turn water on at the M690 head end, and at the M305 mains, but found that there was no water.<sup>101</sup></p> <p>Within an hour, fire damaged the M690 conveyor.<sup>102</sup></p>
6:18pm	Alan Roach overheard a report on the radio that fire was in the south west corner of the

<sup>92</sup> Statement of David Shanahan, (Exhibit 7). [78]; Prezioso T365.22-31.

<sup>93</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [71], Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [74].

<sup>94</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25); First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [75] and Annexure 9.

<sup>95</sup> Harkins, T343.2 – 29; First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [78].

<sup>96</sup> Prezioso T373.16-17; Mauger at [44].

<sup>97</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [90] – [91].

<sup>98</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [86].

<sup>99</sup> Statement of James Mauger (Exhibit 8), [44].

<sup>100</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [89].

<sup>101</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [89].

<sup>102</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [92]; First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [86].

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
	Mine near the river diversion, but that it had not yet crossed the river. <sup>103</sup>  Roach contacted Peter McHugh at the Traralgon ICC to inform him that the Driffield fire has reached the Morwell River diversion. <sup>104</sup>
6:41pm	Alan Roach telephoned Fiona Rickwood to organise meals for Mine staff involved in the fire-fighting operations. <sup>105</sup>
6:44pm	The Mine Emergency Command Centre was notified of 4 CFA tankers on site at the Mine, having entered through the rear slide gate. <sup>106</sup>
7:00pm	As at 7pm, there were 103 Hazelwood employees and contractors on site at the Mine. <sup>107</sup>
7:00pm	An SP Ausnet representative arrived at the Mine to help identify the fault that had caused the loss of power. <sup>108</sup>  Mine personnel and electricians inspected the various pumps on the Hazelwood Cooling Pond, and on the floor of the Mine, to see if power could be restored. <sup>109</sup>
7:00pm	Briefing held for Mine personnel in the ECC. <sup>110</sup>
7:45pm	The Mine ECC was evacuated to Mine Office due to loss of power. <sup>111</sup>
8:00pm	James Faithful assumed the Emergency Commander role, which he filled until 7am the next day. <sup>112</sup>
8:20pm onwards	Either Ross Male or Peter Lockwood of the CFA advised that the CFA was taking control of the fire as Incident Controller. <sup>113</sup>
9:00pm onwards	Mine and CFA personnel spent the evening: <sup>114</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• patrolling around the perimeter of the open cut, monitoring and extinguishing spot fires;</li> <li>• monitoring the progress of the fires on the northern, eastern and southern batters, i.e. watching for flare ups;</li> <li>• protecting key Mine infrastructure, including power substations and high voltage power lines;</li> <li>• to the west of the open cut, monitoring the progress of the Driffield fire which was slowly burning along the Morwell River, and patrolling for spot fires;</li> </ul>

<sup>103</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>104</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>105</sup> Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>106</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), (Annexure 9).

<sup>107</sup> Third Witness Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 58), [4].

<sup>108</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins (Exhibit 10), [91].

<sup>109</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [98].

<sup>110</sup> Statement of James Mauger, [47] and [49].

<sup>111</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [94].

<sup>112</sup> Prezioso T374.3-4; Faithful T386.23-27.

<sup>113</sup> First Statement of Steven Harkins, [88]; Log book of events produced by Alan Roach and Police Statement of Alan Roach, page 8 (Exhibit 25).

<sup>114</sup> Statement of David Shanahan (Exhibit 7), [98] and Annexure 9.

TIME (APPROX)	ACTIVITY
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• escorting SP Ausnet personnel around the Mine to assess fire damage to SP Ausnet power assets;</li> <li>• escorting CFA trucks around the Mine; and</li> <li>• planning for firefighting activities the following day, in consultation with the CFA.</li> </ul>